

## **Unarticulated Tension**

*Lenny Clapp*

### **1. Introduction**

The idea of *unarticulated constituents* is used in several different ways in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. My purpose here is to clarify these uses and thereby illustrate that there is considerable tension between them. More specifically, I will argue that if one endorses the original arguments in support of unarticulated constituents of the contents of thoughts and utterances (Perry 1986), then one should reject the later invocation of unarticulated constituents to solve the familiar puzzles of belief reports (Crimmins and Perry 1989; Crimmins 1993). Since it is John Perry who introduced the notion of unarticulated constituents, my remarks will focus on his uses of the notion. But the conclusions drawn here will be of interest to any philosopher whose views about content, cognitive significance, or belief reports have been influenced by Perry's views. Indeed, in the fifth section I will explore the consequences of these conclusions for *semantic relativism*, a position that bears at least very strong resemblance toward the views advanced in Perry (1986).

### **2. Varieties of Unarticulated Constituents**

In a recent summary of his views Perry distinguishes between three "uses of the idea of unarticulated constituents" (2007: 538). The first use derives from where the idea is introduced, in Perry's (1986), and this use concerns what is represented in *thought*. The main point of "Thought Without Representation" – as is suggested by the title – is that at some basic level of cognition one can have a thought pertaining to an entity, e.g. oneself or one's immediate environment, and yet employ no mental representation

that represents that entity.<sup>1</sup> Or as Perry puts it for the case of thoughts expressed by sentences such as ‘He is to the right’ or ‘That’s a long ways away’, “there are thoughts, roughly expressible by these sorts of sentences, in which the person doing the thinking is not explicitly represented. ... [T]he person having the thought is an unarticulated constituent ...” (2007: 538). So, generalizing now, a constituent of the content of a *thought* that is not represented by any representation in that thought is an *unarticulated constituent* of the content of that thought.

The second use of the idea is closely related to the first. The difference is that the second use deals with what is represented in *language* instead of what is represented in *thought*. Perry explains that “when I say, ‘It’s raining,’ my utterance will be true or false because it is raining or not raining in some particular place, the one I am talking about. That place is an unarticulated constituent of [the] proposition expressed by my utterance” (2007: 538). So, the truth-conditional content of a typical *utterance* of, e.g., ‘It is raining’ that takes place in Palo Alto pertains to Palo Alto, even though there is no *overt* (pronounced or written) word or other representation in the utterance (or inscription) that refers to Palo Alto. So, generalizing again, a constituent of the content of an *utterance* that is not represented by any *overt* representation in that utterance is an *unarticulated constituent* of the content of that utterance.

I will refer to the first use of unarticulated constituents as the *thought use*, and to the second as the *language use*. These uses of the idea of unarticulated constituents are closely related, and mutually supporting. For it is plausible to suppose, and Perry (1986) does suppose, that at least sometimes if a speaker performs an utterance U and object O is an unarticulated constituent of the truth-conditional content of U, then the truth-conditional content of the thought T that the speaker expresses by performing U also has O as an unarticulated constituent. So, for example, if Murdock is an unarticulated constituent of the truth-conditional content of my utterance of ‘It is raining’, then it is plausible to suppose that Murdock is also an unarticulated constituent of the truth-conditional content of the thought I have and express via this utterance.<sup>2</sup> Though it is plausible to suppose that it is at least sometimes the case that an entity that is an unarticulated constituent of the truth-conditional content of an utterance is also an unarticulated constituent of the truth-conditional content of the thought that utterance expresses, there is nothing in Perry’s usage of the idea suggesting that the uses must always coincide in this way: Perry’s usage allows that there be an entity that is an unarticulated constituent of

the truth-conditional content of an utterance, but not an unarticulated constituent of the truth-conditional content of the thought expressed by that utterance. That is, Perry's usage allows for the following: an utterance expresses a thought, and the utterance and thought thereby expressed have the same truth-conditional content, yet there is a constituent of this content that is articulated relative to the thought, but unarticulated relative to the utterance. Indeed, Perry suggests that the example wherein the idea is introduced involving his son's utterance of 'It's raining' may be one such case: Perry writes regarding this case, "Here it is natural to think that we are explaining which unarticulated constituent a statement is about in terms of something like the *articulated* constituents of the beliefs and intentions it expresses" (1986: 142).<sup>3</sup>

Before the third explanatory role played by the idea of unarticulated constituents can be introduced an additional layer of complexity must be recognized. Perry (1986) draws a distinction between *being about* and *concerning*, and the distinction applies to both utterances and thoughts: a thought or utterance that pertains to an entity  $x$ , i.e. whose truth depends upon how things are with  $x$ , can either be *about*  $x$ , or can merely *concern*  $x$ . What is the difference? Precisely how the distinction between *being about* and *concerning* is to be drawn is a matter somewhat open to interpretation, but as I understand Perry the distinction at the level of language depends upon the distinction at the more fundamental level of thought. So in what follows I will first explain how I think the distinction is to be drawn for thought, and then explain how it is to be drawn for language.

At the level of thought *being about* and *being articulated* coincide; a thought is *about* all and only those entities it articulates, i.e. all and only those entities it explicitly represents. So, if an entity  $O$  is a constituent of the truth-conditional content of a thought  $T$ , yet  $O$  is unarticulated by  $T$ , then  $T$  merely *concerns*, and is not *about*,  $O$ . I think it is relatively clear that Perry thinks that *cognitive states* are individuated in terms of the content they are *about*: Two token thoughts  $T_1$  and  $T_2$  are instances of the same *state* only if they are *about* the very same entities; though of course  $T_1$  and  $T_2$  may be instances of the same *state* even if they *concern* different entities.<sup>4</sup>

How the distinction between *being about* and *concerning* is to be drawn in the case language is parasitic upon how the distinction is drawn in the case of thought. This is because Perry seems to maintain that when an utterance  $U$  expresses a thought  $T$ , the aboutness-content of  $U$  just is the aboutness-content of  $T$ . That Perry maintains that the aboutness-content of

an utterance is provided by the aboutness-content of the thought expressed by the utterance is implied by what Perry says with regard to the example of his son, who is in Murdock, uttering ‘It is raining’ in response to Perry, who is in Palo Alto, asking “How are things there?”:

My son’s belief was about Murdock, and his intention was to induce a belief in me that was about Murdock by saying something about Murdock. Here it is natural to think that we are explaining which unarticulated constituent a statement is about in terms of something like the *articulated* constituents of the beliefs and intentions it expresses. (1986: 142, emphasis in original).

Generally then, if an utterance U expresses a thought T, and there is an object O such that O is articulated by T (and thus T is *about* O) but O not articulated by U, then U is *about* O, even though U does not articulate O. So, in contrast to the case of thoughts where *being about* and *being articulated* coincide, some utterances are *about* unarticulated constituents.<sup>5</sup>

The distinction between thoughts and utterances *being about* entities and their *merely concerning* entities requires us to draw a corresponding distinction between two sorts of content. When a Z-lander thinks an *it is raining* thought, his thought concerns, but is not about, Z-land. So what are we to say with regard to the content of this thought? In one sense the content of the thought includes only those entities the thought is *about*, and in this sense the content is not a truth-conditional proposition containing Z-land, but rather a *propositional function* whose value for the argument Z-land is a full truth-conditional proposition whose truth value depends upon the weather in Z-land. But, since we take the Z-lander’s thought to be true or false depending upon the weather in Z-land, there is another sense in which Z-land is a constituent of the content of the Z-lander’s *it is raining* thought, even though that thought merely *concerns*, and is not *about*, Z-land. Let us then call the first sense of ‘content’ *aboutness-content*, and the second sense *concerning-content*.<sup>6</sup>

This distinction between kinds of content in turn gives rise to a distinction between two kinds of unarticulated constituents. For example, Z-land is an unarticulated constituent of the *concerning-content* of the Z-lander’s *it is raining* thought, but Z-land is not an unarticulated constituent of the *aboutness-content* of this thought. Z-land is not an unarticulated constituent of the aboutness-content of the Z-lander’s *it is raining* thought *not* because it is an *articulated* constituent of the aboutness-content, but rather because it is not a constituent of the aboutness-content at all. A diagram will serve to summarize and clarify the complex relationships

between the first two uses of the idea of unarticulated constituents, and the two varieties of content:

*Table 1.* Aboutness content, concerning-content and unarticulated constituents

	Aboutness-content	Concerning-content
Thought	No unarticulated constituents. Sometimes truth-conditional, and sometimes a propositional function.	Some unarticulated constituents. Always truth-conditional.
Language	Some unarticulated constituents. Sometimes truth-conditional, and sometimes a propositional function.	Some unarticulated constituents. Always truth-conditional.

The categories on the left of the table are the two relevant kinds of representations: *Thought* includes instances of complex mental representations and *Language* includes instances of natural language expressions. The categories above the table are the relevant sorts of content that these kinds of representations can have, where these kinds of content correspond to Perry's distinction between *being about* and *concerning*. The information inside the table answers two questions: First, are there unarticulated constituents of this variety of content? And second, is this variety of content always truth-conditional? So, for example, the information in the bottom-left quadrant tells us that, first, there are *utterances* whose aboutness-content contains a constituent that is not articulated by that utterance, and second, that the aboutness-content of some utterances is truth-conditional, but for others it is only a propositional function and thus non-truth-conditional.

A few remarks regarding the information in the table may serve to further clarify the variety of unarticulated constituents involved in Perry's first two uses of the idea. Note that concerning-content is always truth-conditional. This is because, by definition, only thoughts and utterances whose aboutness-content is a propositional function have concerning-content; the concerning-content of such a thought or utterance is the result of feeding an appropriate argument into the propositional-function that is its aboutness-content. Aboutness-content, on the other hand, is sometimes truth-conditional (because some thoughts and utterances articulate full

truth-conditional propositions), and sometimes not; some of our thoughts and utterances are like the Z-landers' weather thoughts and utterances in that they articulate only propositional functions *from* the entities those thoughts concern *to* propositions containing those entities. It is this last idea, that the aboutness-content of a subject's thought or utterance can be a mere function from entities in the environment of the subject to full truth-conditional propositions, that has inspired, or at least bares a strong resemblance to, *semantic relativism*. For the essence of semantic relativism is the idea that some utterances – utterances pertaining to the future, or to matters of personal taste, or to knowledge, etc. – have content that is true or false only relative to some further parameter. (The similarities between Perry's thought and language uses of the idea of unarticulated constituents and the framework of semantic relativism will be explained in more detail in the fifth section.)

The third and final explanatory use of the idea of unarticulated constituents is related to Crimmins and Perry's proposed analysis of belief reports. Crimmins and Perry maintain that analyzing utterances of belief reports as having contents with unarticulated constituents is essential to solving the "doxastic puzzle cases" (1989: 687).<sup>7</sup> The puzzle is to explain why, e.g., utterances of

(1) *Miles Hendon believes that he is of royal blood.*

and

(2) *Miles Hendon believes that Edward Tudor is of royal blood.*

not only seem to us to say different things, but also have different truth values, even though the relevant utterances of 'he' and 'Edward Tudor' are coreferential.<sup>8</sup>

Crimmins and Perry's (1989) general strategy for solving the puzzle is as follows. According to Crimmins and Perry basic *thoughts* – and a *belief* is one sort of *thought* – are particular structured mental representations composed of *notions* and *ideas*, where a *notion* is a mental particular that represents a particular individual, and an *idea* is a mental particular that represents a property. Notions, like Frege's senses, correspond to *ways of thinking* of particular things; where Frege would say a subject is grasping two senses of the same referent, Crimmins and Perry would say that the subject is employing two *notions* of the same referent. Now Crimmins and

Perry maintain that “in reporting beliefs, we quite often are talking about such notions, though our belief reports do not explicitly mention them” (1989: 697). So, Crimmins and Perry claim that the reason we interpret utterances of (1) and (2) as saying different things and having different truth values is that a typical utterance of (1) will have one of Miles Hendon’s notions of the young prince (a notion associated with the concepts of royalty and wealth, say) as an unarticulated constituent of its content, while a typical utterance of (2) will have some other notion of the young prince (a notion associated with a visual experience of a boy dressed in rags, say) as an unarticulated constituent of its content.<sup>9</sup> Thus the general idea behind Crimmins and Perry’s proposed solution is that such utterances have different notions as unarticulated constituents of their contents in something like the way different utterances of ‘It is raining’ have different locations as unarticulated constituents of their contents. And if the truth-conditional contents of utterances of (1) and (2) contain distinct (unarticulated) constituents, it is no longer puzzling that they have distinct truth values.

The formal details of Crimmins and Perry’s analysis of attitude ascriptions are presented in the following passage<sup>10</sup>:

We take a belief report to be an utterance  $u$  of a belief sentence of the form

A believes that S

where A is a singular term and S is a sentence. We assume a semantics for the use of the embedded sentence, so that  $Con(u_s)$  (the content of  $u_s$ ) is the proposition expressed by the subutterance of  $u$  corresponding to S. Where  $u$  is a belief report at  $t$  which is about notions  $n_1 \dots n_k$ , and  $p = Con(u_s)$ ,

$$Con(u) = \exists b [B(a,b,t) \wedge Content(b,t) = p \wedge \bigwedge_{r_i \text{ in } p} Responsible(n_i, r_i, b)]$$

The claim made by the belief report is that the agent  $a$  has a belief with content  $p$ , involving the notions  $n_1 \dots n_k$  (in a certain way). This claim entails the proposition that  $a$  has a belief with the content  $p$ , but the truth of that proposition is not sufficient for the truth of the report – the report says more than that about the ascribed belief. (1989: 697-698)

To understand the above formal schema we need to have a working conception of the ternary relation of *responsibility*. Crimmins and Perry conceive of a belief as being structurally isomorphic with the proposition that is its content. We can think of them both as having a syntactic tree-structure in common, but where the “leaves on the tree” of the belief are

notions and ideas, the leaves on the tree of the proposition that is the content of that belief are the individuals and properties represented by the corresponding notions and ideas. The *roles* in a proposition are the places where the represented entities are; the roles of a proposition are, if you will, the places where the leaves grow on the tree-structure. Now, to say that a particular notion  $n_i$  of belief  $b$  is *responsible* for role  $r_i$  of proposition  $p$  is simply to say that the content of  $n_i$  is what “fills” role  $r_i$  in  $p$ . It is important to notice that in the above formal schema ‘ $n_i$ ’ is *not* a bound variable: rather it is a sort of schematic letter to be replaced by a *name* for a notion, and for any true (or false) belief report there must be such a name corresponding to each role  $r_i$  of proposition  $p$ . In other words, the unarticulated constituent analysis entails that a true (or false) utterance of a belief report tacitly refers to a notion (or idea) of every constituent of the proposition  $p$  articulated by the complement clause: there can be no constituent of  $p$  that is not represented by some tacitly referred to notion (or idea).

### 3. The Primary Tension: Reporting Beliefs that Have Unarticulated Constituents

Distinguishing clearly between the three uses of the idea of unarticulated constituents makes apparent a significant tension between the *thought* use and the *belief report* use: According to the former a subject can have a belief whose concerning-content contains a constituent that is in no way mentally represented by the subject. But according to the latter what one reports when one reports a subject’s belief is not only the content of that belief, but also the particular mental representations – the particular notions and ideas – the subject utilizes in the belief. Indeed, we have just seen that Crimmins and Perry’s unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports applies only to beliefs  $b$  that fully articulate their content  $p$ . And now the tension is apparent: Crimmins and Perry’s analysis of belief reports presupposes that if a subject has a belief  $b$  with a content  $p$ , then  $p$  is fully represented, fully articulated, by  $b$ . But this clearly conflicts with the proposal that the concerning-contents of some of our thoughts, in particular some of our beliefs, contain unarticulated constituents, entities that are not represented by notions, ideas, or any other sort of mental representation.

The tension can be illustrated in terms of an example. Suppose that when Perry’s son uttered ‘It’s raining’ the location, Palo Alto, is articulated



neither by the utterance, nor by the thought the utterance expresses. Now suppose that in an attempt to report to you the belief that Perry's son had when he performed this utterance of 'It is raining' I utter the following:

(3) *Perry's son believes that it is raining.*

If we assume that the relevant proposition  $p$  is *that it is raining in Palo Alto*, then, according to Perry's analysis of belief reports, my utterance is true only if I tacitly refer to a notion in Perry's son's belief that represents Palo Alto – such a notion is an unarticulated constituent of my utterance of (3). Applying the above formal schema for the analysis to this case yields the following: Let  $u^*$  be my utterance of (3), and  $t^*$  be the time of  $u^*$ , and finally let  $p^*$  be the proposition that is the concerning-content of my subutterance of 'it is raining', so  $p^*$  is the proposition *that it is raining in Palo Alto*. (I will demonstrate below that other problems arise if one takes  $p$  in the schema to be the aboutness-content of my subutterance.) Then  $Con(u^*) =$

$$\exists b [B(\text{Perry's son}, b, t^*) \wedge \text{Content}(b, t^*) = p^* \wedge \\ \text{Responsible}(N_{\text{Palo Alto}}, R_{\text{Palo Alto}}, b) \wedge \text{Responsible}(I_{\text{rain}}, R_{\text{rain}}, b)]$$

where ' $N_{\text{Palo Alto}}$ ' allegedly refers to the token mental representation in Perry's son's belief that is a *notion* of Palo Alto, and ' $I_{\text{rain}}$ ' refers to the token mental representation in this belief that is Perry's son's *idea* of the property of rain, and ' $R_{\text{Palo Alto}}$ ' refers to the role filled by Palo Alto in  $p^*$  and ' $R_{\text{rain}}$ ' refers to the role filled by the property of *rain* in  $p^*$ . (For simplicity I will treat *rain* is a property of places, instead of a relation between places and times.) The problem is that since Perry's son's belief merely *concerns* Palo Alto and is not *about* Palo Alto, there is no relevant notion of Palo Alto to which my utterance of (3) could tacitly refer. That is, if Perry's son's belief merely concerns Palo Alto, then ' $N_{\text{Palo Alto}}$ ' lacks a referent. Thus, the unarticulated constituent analysis incorrectly predicts my utterance of (3) to be neither true nor false. Or perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that the analysis simply does not apply to such reports of beliefs with unarticulated constituents.<sup>11</sup>

In the above application of Crimmins and Perry's analysis to my utterance of (3), I have assumed that the relevant sort of content of the subutterance of 'it is raining' is *concerning-content*, rather than *aboutness-content*. That full truth-conditional concerning-content, rather than

propositional-function aboutness-content, is the kind of content invoked in the unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports is strongly suggested by Crimmins and Perry's presentation of the analysis, since they always assume that contents of the reported beliefs are fully propositional.<sup>12</sup> They write, for example, "Each belief has as its content the *proposition* that the objects its notions are of have the property or stand in the relation, that its idea is of" (1989: 692, emphasis added). The problem we have encountered is that according to Perry (1986), some beliefs have full truth-conditional propositions only as their concerning-content, and such concerning-contents contain constituents unarticulated by any notion or idea in the belief; in such cases the above assumption is false. But perhaps Crimmins and Perry's could amend their analysis of belief reports by simply giving up this assumption in cases such as (3), in which a belief with an unarticulated constituent in its concerning-content is being reported. That is, perhaps the relevant sort of content of the subutterance of the complement clause is not concerning-content – which is sometimes not fully articulated in thought – but rather aboutness-content – which is always fully articulated in thought. One consequence of this would be that the relevant content –  $p$  in the formal schemata – would sometimes be a propositional function and not a full truth-conditional proposition. Amended in this way the analysis of (3) would be as follows:  $Con(u^*) =$

$$\exists b [B(\text{Perry's son}, b, t^*) \wedge \text{aboutness-content}(b, t^*) = f^* \wedge \text{Responsible}(I_{rain}, R_{rain}, b)]^{13}$$

where ' $f^*$ ' designates the aboutness-content of Perry's son's belief, i.e. ' $f^*$ ' designates the propositional function that, given a location as argument, delivers a proposition that is true *iff* it is raining at that location. This amended unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports takes into account Perry's (1986) claim that some beliefs have only propositional functions as aboutness-content. Under the amended analysis my utterance of (3) reports only that Perry's son believes it is raining *simpliciter*; it does not report that Perry's son believes it is raining in Palo Alto with a belief that utilizes a particular notion of Palo Alto. Thus the amended analysis, according to which only aboutness-content is reported, yields the correct result that my utterance of (3) is true.

The problem, however, is that, at least under normal circumstances, in reporting beliefs what matters to us is the fully propositional content of the belief. And this holds even for beliefs which, according to the thought use

of unarticulated constituents, have unarticulated constituents of their concerning-contents. Suppose Perry's son is a musician in a touring band. It has been a long and exhausting tour, and the weather has been terrible in every city on the tour. The band is now in Palo Alto, though Perry's son does not know this; in the blur of late-night performances and sleepy drives in the van, Perry's son has lost track of where he is. You are with the band in yet another dingy hotel, and you witness Perry's son wake up, look out the window, and then mutter to himself, "Damn – its raining." Here we have a very plausible case where, in keeping with the thought use of unarticulated constituents, Perry's son has expressed a belief that concerns, but is not about, Palo Alto. Now, suppose I call you on the phone, from Sacramento say. I am worried that all the bad weather, which I hear about on TV, is taking an emotional toll on the tired musicians. So I ask you, "Are they awake yet? Are they aware that it is raining there?" It seems perfectly appropriate for you to respond to my question by uttering,

(4) *Perry's son believes that it is raining here.*

Indeed, given that my question specifically asks about the musicians' beliefs with regard to the rain *there*, an appropriate response must *at least concern* the relevant location.<sup>14</sup> So, even if you had uttered only

(4') *Perry's son believes that it is raining.*

the truth-conditional concerning-content of *your report* would, despite the absence of an overt word referring to the relevant location, none-the-less contain the relevant location, Palo Alto, as an unarticulated constituent. So, the tension between the thought and belief report uses cannot be resolved by maintaining that only aboutness-content of beliefs is reported.

Let us review. According to Crimmins and Perry's original (1989) analysis, attitude reports always attempt to report both the fully-propositional contents of beliefs and the notions and ideas which fully articulate such propositions. We saw above, however, that this analysis does not apply to beliefs which do not fully articulate *propositional* content; it does not apply to beliefs with unarticulated constituents in their concerning-content. One way to avoid this difficulty would be to maintain that belief reports always attempt to report only the aboutness-content of beliefs; this would avoid the difficulty because aboutness-content, which is sometimes only a propositional-function, is always fully articulated. We

have just seen, however, that even with regard to beliefs that do not fully articulate propositions (i.e. beliefs with unarticulated constituents in their concerning-content), in reporting a belief we are usually interested in the fully-propositional content of the belief. So, it will not do to maintain that in reporting beliefs we are always interested only in their aboutness-content.

A natural suggestion to make at this point would be to acknowledge that in making a belief report we are (usually) interested in the fully-propositional concerning-content of the belief, but to reject the assumption made in Crimmins and Perry's (1989) analysis that a belief report must tacitly refer to a notion or idea of *every* constituent of this propositional content. That is, instead of

$$\text{Con}(u) = \exists b [\text{B}(a,b,t) \wedge \text{Content}(b,t) = p \wedge \bigwedge_{r_i \text{ in } p} \text{Responsible}(n_i, r_i, b)]$$

Crimmins and Perry should endorse something like following *compromise* analysis

$$\text{Con}(u) = \exists b [\text{B}(a,b,t) \wedge \text{Concerning-content}(b,t) = p \wedge \bigwedge_{r_i \text{ in } p \text{ that is articulated by } b} \text{Responsible}(n_i, r_i, b)]$$

where a *role*  $r_i$  in proposition  $p$  is *articulated* by belief  $b$  just in case there is a notion or idea in  $b$  that fills  $r_i$ . The motivation for the compromise analysis is to combine three ideas: first, a true belief report must express the fully propositional concerning-content of the belief; second, a true belief report must involve tacit reference to whatever notions and ideas comprise the belief that has this concerning-content; and third, in cases of beliefs with unarticulated constituents in their concerning-contents, a true belief report need *not* involve tacit reference to any notions (or ideas) of these unarticulated constituents.

Note, however, that the compromise analysis of belief reports has excised some of resources that were posited for the purpose of solving the doxastic puzzles. That is, according to Crimmins and Perry (1989) the explanation of why utterances of (1) and (2) have different truth conditions, despite the fact that the utterances attribute belief in the same proposition to the same subject, is that the speaker tacitly refers to different notions (and ideas) that the subject uses to represent this proposition. But under the proposed compromise analysis, in uttering (4) I do not tacitly refer to a

notion that represents Palo Alto, since Palo Alto is an unarticulated constituent of the concerning-content of Perry's son's belief, there is no such notion that fills the relevant role of the proposition. But this means that the compromise analysis lacks the resources to solve puzzle cases involving such unarticulated constituents, and it is not difficult to formulate such puzzle cases.

Consider again the above described case involving Perry's exhausted son. Suppose that after asking of the tired musicians, "Do they believe it is raining *there*?" and hearing you utter (4) in response, I ask further, "Yeah, but does he believe it is raining in *Palo Alto*?" It seems that it would *not* be correct for you to respond to this second question in the affirmative. That is, it would not be correct for you to respond to my question by uttering

(5) *Perry's son believes that it is raining in Palo Alto.*

Perry's son's believes *that it is raining*, and this belief *concerns* his current location. But because of his exhausted state, Perry's son does not realize that he is currently in Palo Alto. (We might suppose that he has never even heard of Palo Alto.) Thus, though he believes that it is raining at his current location, he does not realize that his current location is Palo Alto, and so he does not believe it is raining in Palo Alto. Since the utterances of (4) and (5) attribute belief in the same proposition to Perry's son, we have a puzzle case analogous to the puzzle case involving (1) and (2). But, under the proposed compromise analysis the utterances of (4) and (5) would express the very same proposition, since there are no relevant notions of Palo Alto to which the speaker might tacitly refer. The compromise analysis thus lacks the resources to solve such puzzle cases involving unarticulated constituents of the subject's belief.<sup>15</sup>

It is relatively easy to multiply this sort of puzzle case, wherein a subject has a belief whose concerning-content has an unarticulated constituent.<sup>16</sup> Suppose Watson believes *that the salt is to the left*, and he himself is an unarticulated constituent of the concerning-content of his belief; thus the concerning-content of Watson's belief is something like, *that the salt is to Watson's left*. But we are in a house of mirrors, and Watson believes that some of the reflections are of another man, though in fact all are reflections of him. In such a scenario, different utterances of

(6) *Watson believes that the salt is to his left.*

(wherein the utterance of ‘his’ is accompanied by demonstrations toward various reflections) can vary in truth value, depending upon which reflection is demonstrated. When the demonstrated reflection is such that Watson believes it to be a reflection of himself, the corresponding utterance of (6) would be true. But when the demonstrated reflection is such that Watson believes it to be of a different person, it is likely that the corresponding utterance of (6) is false. Again we have constructed a doxastic puzzle case that Crimmins and Perry’s unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports cannot solve; for Watson is an unarticulated constituent of the concerning-content of the belief in question, and thus there are no relevant notions or ideas that might be tacitly referred to by different utterances of (6).

Such cases reveal that there is a fundamental tension between the use of unarticulated constituents in the analysis of belief reports and the thought use of unarticulated constituents. If Perry (1986) is correct to maintain that there are unarticulated constituents of the concerning-contents of beliefs (and other cognitive states) then many doxastic puzzle cases cannot be explained by Crimmins and Perry’s unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports. It seems then that one cannot endorse both Perry’s (1986) view that there is such a thing as thought without representation and his later (1989) proposal that what explains the doxastic puzzles is tacit reference to different notions and ideas utilized by the subject.

#### ***4. Secondary Tensions: Cognitive Significance and Tacit Reference Fixing***

Another tension between the uses of the idea of unarticulated constituents is related to the question of whether or not unarticulated constituents are explanatorily relevant with regard to the *cognitive significance* of thoughts and utterances. The view according to which there are unarticulated constituents of the concerning-contents of thoughts, i.e. the view that there is thought without representation, is a form of *content externalism*. It allows, for example, that Bert and Twin-Bert might think different *it is raining* contents even if they employ the very same mental representations, even if they are molecule for molecule doppelgangers, because such representations contain no elements that represent the different locations in those contents.<sup>17</sup> Or, to put it terms of switching instead of doppelgangers, if we could switch Bert back forth between Palo Alto and Murdock without

his knowing it, he could think different *it is raining* concerning-contents without his being cognizant of doing so. Thus, unarticulated constituents of the concerning-contents of thoughts are wholly irrelevant to explaining the cognitive significance of thoughts. The same point applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to unarticulated constituents of the concerning-contents of utterances, where the utterances in question are expressions of thoughts whose concerning-contents contain unarticulated constituents. Suppose Bert utters ‘It is raining’ in Palo Alto and that Palo Alto is an unarticulated constituent of both the utterance and the thought Bert thereby expresses. Now suppose we surreptitiously switch Bert to Murdoch where he utters this sentence again, so that now Murdoch is an unarticulated constituent of the concerning-content both the utterance and the thought thereby expressed. Bert would not be aware of having said different things; despite expressing different truth-conditional concerning-contents, the utterances would have the same cognitive significance for Bert. (I am here again ignoring the time parameter.)

What this illustrates is that unarticulated constituents of the concerning-content of an utterance are irrelevant to explaining the cognitive significance of the utterance.<sup>18</sup> But in order to solve the doxastic puzzle involving, e.g., utterances of (1) and (2), one of the things that must be explained is the difference in cognitive significance between the utterances.<sup>19</sup> And if unarticulated constituents are to play this role in explaining our judgments that utterances of (1) and (2) say different things, then the invoked articulated constituents must be represented somehow in our minds. Miles Hendon’s distinct notions of the young prince cannot be unrepresented by you when you hear utterances of (1) and (2) in the way that Palo Alto can be unrepresented by Perry’s son when he looks out the window in Palo Alto and says it is raining. Palo Alto – the unarticulated constituent of the concerning-content of Perry’s son’s thought – has no effect whatsoever on the cognitive significance of that utterance for him because it is not mentally represented by him. In contrast, if Miles Hendon’s distinct notions of the young prince – the relevant unarticulated constituents of utterances of (1) and (2) – are to explain the difference in cognitive significance of such utterances for you, these notions must be mentally represented by you, and moreover if tacit reference to such notions is to explain why (1) and (2) differ in cognitive significance for you, these notions must be represented by you in different ways. This means that the thoughts expressed to you by utterances of (1) and (2) must employ distinct notions *of distinct notions* of the young prince.<sup>20</sup> So the

(1989) belief report use of unarticulated constituents differs from the (1986) thought and language uses. The unarticulated constituents of the truth-conditional content of a belief report must, in order to be explanatorily relevant to the cognitive significance of the report for an interpreter, be mentally represented by the interpreter; in contrast, the principle thesis defended in Perry (1986) is that the truth-conditional contents of utterances might contain constituents that are explicitly represented neither by the utterance nor by the thought thereby expressed.

A closely related issue concerns how unarticulated constituents of the contents of thoughts and utterances are fixed. In the case where one looks out the window, perceives rain, and thereby comes to believe it is raining, Perry maintains that there is an “external guarantee that the weather information we receive be about, and our actions concern, our own locale” (1986: 149). So, for example, the reason that the concerning-content of Perry’s son’s utterance of ‘It is raining’ and the belief thereby expressed have Palo Alto as an unarticulated constituent is that Perry’s son is located in Palo Alto when he perceives the rain, formulates the belief, and performs the utterance. That all of these events occur in Palo Alto is the “external guarantee” that fixes Palo Alto, as opposed to Murdock or some other location, as an unarticulated constituent of the concerning-content of both the thought and the utterance. It is because of this external guarantee that Perry’s son need not explicitly represent Palo Alto in his utterance, nor in his thought, in order for his utterance and thought to pertain to Palo Alto, as opposed to some other location. And similar remarks apply to thoughts and utterances relative to which the thinker and/or speaker himself is an unarticulated constituent. When Perry thinks, e.g., *There is a milkshake just two feet away!* his thought has the concerning-content that the milkshake is two feet away *from Perry* because *Perry’s* sight of the milkshake caused *Perry* to form this belief, which subsequently causes *Perry* to advance; these coordinated facts constitute the “external guarantee” that fixes Perry, as opposed to somebody else, as an unarticulated constituent of the concerning-content of his thought. Or as Perry puts it, “The eyes that see and the torso or legs that move are part of the same more or less integrated body. And this fact, external to the belief, supplies the needed coordination” (1986: 151).

In contrast, in the case of the analysis of belief reports there are no such “external guarantees” that would suffice to fix one notion (or idea), as opposed as some other notion (or idea), as an unarticulated constituent.<sup>21</sup> For in the case of the meta-beliefs one expresses in belief reports – one’s



beliefs concerning another's beliefs – there is no such systematic coordination between features of the environments in which meta-beliefs are formed and expressed, and the notions and ideas that are alleged to be unarticulated constituents of the contents of those utterances. When Perry's son looks out the window and utters 'It is raining' his utterance and the thought he thereby expresses concern Palo Alto because he is in Palo Alto when he perceives, thinks and speaks. But, assuming that an utterance of (1) does tacitly refer to one of Miles Hendon's notions  $n$ , there is no such coordination between the environment in which the speaker perceives, thinks, and speaks, and  $n$ . (Indeed,  $n$  may have ceased to exist long before the belief report that is alleged to tacitly refer to  $n$  is uttered.) So, here we have another reason for supposing that the notions (and ideas) tacitly referred to by utterances of belief reports must be articulated in the meta-beliefs expressed by such utterances. For given the lack of "external guarantees" that determine what the unarticulated constituents are, there is nothing other than the beliefs and intentions of the speaker that could determine which notions and are ideas are tacitly referred to by the utterance.

In summary then, there is a significant difference between, on the one hand, the (1986) thought and language uses of unarticulated constituents, and, on the other hand, the (1989) belief report use. The main thesis of "Thought without Representation" is, as is suggested by the title, that the truth-conditional content of our thoughts and the utterances that express them can outstrip what is explicitly represented by them; i.e. the truth-conditional content of our thoughts and utterances can contain unarticulated constituents. Such entities are not determined to be constituents of the truth-conditional content by being explicitly represented by thoughts and utterances; rather they are fixed as constituents of the truth-conditional content by "external guarantees." Moreover, such unarticulated constituents of the truth-conditional content of thoughts and utterances are, *because* they are unarticulated, irrelevant to the cognitive significance of such thoughts and utterances. In contrast, the unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports is committed to the position that the notions and ideas tacitly referred to by an utterance of a belief report are fully articulated in the thought that is expressed by the utterance of that report. For in the case of belief reports there are no "external guarantees" that could determine which notions and ideas are the unarticulated constituents.<sup>22</sup> And moreover the unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports must explain the difference in cognitive significance between, e.g., utterances of (1) and (2),

but the tacitly referred to notions and ideas would be irrelevant to such explanations unless they were articulated in the meta-beliefs expressed by belief reports.

I admit, however, that these secondary tensions do not constitute outright incompatibility between the uses. That is, there would be nothing contradictory in maintaining that the unarticulated constituents of the truth-conditional contents of belief reports differ from other sorts of unarticulated constituents in that the unarticulated constituents of belief reports must be fully articulated in the thoughts thereby expressed. Nonetheless, appreciation of the secondary tension does serve to undermine the central argument Crimmins and Perry offer to motivate their unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports. For Crimmins and Perry (1989) support their treatment of belief reports as involving notions and ideas as unarticulated constituents by analogy with the sorts of utterances that Perry (1986) treats as involving unarticulated constituents. But, given the secondary tensions described above, the analogy is rather weak.

In motivating their proposal that utterances of belief reports have notions and ideas as unarticulated constituents, Crimmins and Perry cite what are alleged to be analogous cases: weather reports which can concern different locations (1989: 699); time reports which can concern different time zones (1989: 700); and velocity reports which can concern different frames of reference (1989: 701). And in the following passage they summarize the general theoretical perspective that justifies positing unarticulated constituents in all such cases:

Unarticulated constituency is one example of the incrementality of language. In the circumstances of an utterance, there always is a great deal of common knowledge and mutual expectation that can and must be exploited if communication is to take place. It is the function of the expression uttered to provide just the last bit of information needed by the hearer to ascertain the intended claim. What is obvious in context we not belabor in syntax – we do not articulate it. (1989: 700).

Now, it seems quite plausible that, e.g., when we are driving in my car and you warn me that I am speeding by uttering ‘You’re going eighty-five miles per hour!’ it is in some sense obvious in context what the relevant frame of reference is. And in this case it seems indubitable that our exploiting the same frame of reference is an essential aspect of “common knowledge and mutual expectation” and moreover that because of this it need be explicitly represented in neither our utterances nor our thoughts.<sup>23</sup> As Perry (1986) might put it, when it comes to our thoughts and utterances

concerning velocity, there is a little Z-lander in us. But, as consideration of the secondary tensions makes clear, the case of belief reports is much different. Suppose that I explain to you why McCain chose Palin as his running-mate by uttering ‘He thought that she would win-over the working-class’. According to the unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports, my utterance has one of McCain’s *notions* of Palin as an unarticulated constituent of its truth-conditional content. But in this case there is not some particular notion McCain has of Palin such that it is part of the “common knowledge and mutual expectation” between us that my utterance concerns this notion. So, if such a notion really is an unarticulated constituent of the truth-conditional content of my utterance, then, since it is not “obvious in context” *which* notion my utterance concerns, it could only be my beliefs and referential intentions that fix this notion as an unarticulated constituent. Moreover, as I know very little about McCain’s mental representations, it seems implausible that I would have such discriminating (tacit) referential intentions. And it seems even less plausible that in order for you to understand my report you would have to discern these communicative intentions and thereby identify the relevant notions and ideas. At any rate, regardless of these issues of plausibility, the secondary tensions serves to undermine the analogy between the alleged unarticulated constituents of belief reports, and the unarticulated constituents of weather reports, time reports, and velocity reports.

## 5. Consequences for Semantic Relativism

Semantic Relativism is a general theoretical perspective that utilizes ideas very similar to those advanced in Perry (1986).<sup>24</sup> The principle motivation for semantic relativism is that it can explain the phenomenon of *faultless disagreement*. This phenomenon arises for many sorts of sentences, but perhaps the paradigm case involves predicates of personal taste.<sup>25</sup> The central idea is this: Two subjects might disagree about the *content* of (7), which contains no (relevant) context-sensitive terms:

(7) *Roller-coasters are fun.*

But, disagreement regarding what is said by utterances of (7) differs from paradigmatic cases of disagreement in that it seems that there is no objective fact of the matter that might, even in principle, settle the matter. It seems that if Mary sincerely avows the content of (7), yet John disavows it, neither one could be wrong; indeed, it seems that both are in some sense right. So, though they disagree, they are both faultless in the sense that both are in some sense right. But this is puzzling: How can Mary and John disagree over the content of (7) if they are both right?

The distinction between aboutness-content and concerning-content allows one to provide an explanation, the essence of which is that Mary's true avowal and John's true disavowal take place at the level of different concerning-contents, while the disagreement takes place at the level of shared aboutness-content. The case of faultless disagreement is analogous to the case where Perry, who is in Palo Alto, judges the aboutness-content *it is raining* to be true, while his son, who is in Murdock, judges this same aboutness-content to be false. In this case Perry's *it is raining* thought concerns Palo Alto, whereas Perry's son's *it is raining* thought concerns Murdock. Assuming that at the time of judgment it is raining in Palo Alto, but not in Murdock, both Perry and his son are correct. The shared aboutness-content that Perry avows and his son disavows is the propositional function from locations  $L$  to propositions, propositions that are true *iff* it is raining at  $L$ . (I continue to ignore the time parameter.) For Palo Alto as argument, this function has a true proposition as its value, but for Murdock, it has a false proposition as its value. The explanation for the faultless disagreement between Mary and John is analogous: the shared aboutness-content of (7) is a propositional function, and a judgment regarding the truth or falsity of this aboutness-content can be assessed only relative to an unarticulated constituent of the concerning-content of such a judgment. The one difference is that whereas in the *it is raining* case the relevant unarticulated constituents of the concerning-contents are locations, in the *roller-coasters are fun* case the relevant unarticulated constituents are *judges*, specifically judges as to what is fun. When Mary avows the aboutness-content of (7) and her avowal is assessed as true, her avowal is taken to concern herself as judge; whereas when John denies the aboutness-content of (7) and his denial is assessed as correct, his denial is taken to concern himself as judge. So, in summary, the reason that Mary and John disagree is that Mary avows yet John disavows the same *roller-coasters are fun* aboutness-content. Yet this aboutness-content is only a propositional function, and thus avowals and disavowals regarding this aboutness-content

can be assessed for truth only relative to entities such judgments concern; in this case such entities, which are unarticulated constituents of the concerning-contents of the avowals and disavowals, are judges – judges as to what is fun.<sup>26</sup>

Given these similarities between semantic relativism and Perry's thought and language uses of the idea of unarticulated constituents, one would expect the same tension that was found to obtain between the uses of the idea of unarticulated constituents to also obtain between semantic relativism and the unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports. And this is indeed the case. In what follows I will present such a puzzle case for Lasersohn's (2005) relativistic analysis of predicates of personal taste. I have chosen Lasersohn's treatment of predicates of personal taste because he specifically addresses the issue of belief reports in a relativistic framework (though he does not address the sort of opacity problems I discuss). But I think it is clear that similar puzzle cases can be formulated for relativistic analysis of other sorts; there is no particular feature of Lasersohn's relativistic treatment of predicates of personal taste that gives rise to the tension.

Suppose one of Peter's acquaintances is Mad Max, and, as his name suggests, Mad Max delights in danger and excitement. Another of Peter's acquaintances is Gentle Jim. Peter knows that Gentle Jim enjoys knitting and old movies, and Peter cannot even imagine Gentle Jim agreeing to go to amusement park, much less enjoying the experience of riding a roller-coaster. But, as luck would have it, unbeknownst to Peter and Peter's other friends, Mad Max and Gentle Jim are one and the same person. Now suppose Peter and his other friends are discussing Max's recent trip to an amusement park, and wondering whether or not Max, whom they all know to be a thrill-seeker, enjoyed himself. "Did he enjoy himself?" a friend asks. Peter, who saw Max dozing on the Merry-go-round, but laughing and yelling with excitement on the roller-coaster, replies, "Well, the roller coaster was fun." When Peter performs this utterance of 'The roller-coaster was fun' Peter is not expressing the judgment that it was fun *for himself*; rather he is expressing what is fun *for Max*. Lasersohn (2005) says that judgments concerning what is fun for *oneself* are made from what he calls the "autocentric perspective," while judgments concerning what is fun *for another* are made from an "exocentric perspective." Moreover, Lasersohn claims that the exocentric perspective is required when one is expressing judgments of personal taste concerning a particular event that one did not oneself participate in. So, since Peter's utterance and the judgment it is

expresses concern Max's riding the roller-coaster, they are made from an exocentric perspective. Hence, whether or not they are true depends upon whether or not riding the roller-coaster was fun *for Max*. The content of Peter's utterance and the judgment it expresses, however, is simply that the riding event was fun *simpliciter*; the content is a propositional-function from judges to truth-conditional propositions. In terms of Perry's distinction between concerning and being about, Peter's utterance and judgment *concern* Max, but they are not *about* Max.

Now suppose that I want to report to you the belief that Peter expressed with his utterance of 'The roller-coaster was fun'. Given that Peter does not realize that Max and Jim are the same person, it seems that an utterance of (8) would be true, while an utterance of (9) would be false, despite the fact that (8) and (9) articulate the same proposition:

(8) *Peter thinks that the roller-coaster was fun for Max.*

(9) *Peter thinks that the roller-coaster was fun for Jim.*

But how this difference in truth conditions, and even truth values, to be explained, given that content of the belief I am reporting merely *concerns* Max/Jim, and thus does not explicitly represent him? This doxastic puzzle case is of course analogous to the previous puzzle case involving utterances of (4) and (5): If semantic relativism is correct, then Peter can judge that the roller-coaster ride was *for Max/Jim* without in any way mentally representing Max/Jim. And hence the intuitive difference in truth conditions between utterances of (8) and (9) cannot be explained by appeal to tacit reference to different ways of representing Max/Jim.<sup>27</sup>

Let me be clear that I am not posing such doxastic puzzles as an objection against semantic relativism. My point rather is that because semantic relativism is in the relevant respects analogous to Perry's (1986) views regarding unarticulated constituents, semantic relativism would also be in tension with an analysis of belief reports that is similar in the relevant respects to Crimmins and Perry's (1989) unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports: If, as I have suggested, the extra parameters that semantic relativists posit in the circumstances of evaluation (judges, times, standards of evidence, etc.<sup>28</sup>) are analogous to Perry's unarticulated constituents, then one cannot consistently endorse both semantic relativism and an approach to belief reports that attempts to explain the doxastic puzzles by invoking different mental representations utilized by the subjects.

## 6. A Resolving Tension?

In conclusion I will discuss one more tension in Perry's views, though, to be fair, this final tension is not internal to Perry's views concerning uses of the idea of unarticulated constituents. Perry (2001) warns against what he calls the "subject matter fallacy": "the subject matter fallacy is supposing that the content of a statement or a belief is wholly constituted ... by the conditions it puts on the objects the words designate or the ideas are of" (2001: 50). But in proposing his own unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports is Perry not himself guilty of committing the subject matter fallacy? Taylor, who is making essentially the same point, puts it this way:

One might have expected Perry to say that the mistake of many previously extant approaches to attitude statements is to assume that embedding somehow effects, for good or for ill, the subject matter of the relevant [utterance]. ... To think otherwise, one might have expected Perry to say, is to commit a subject matter fallacy" (2007: 217).

Frege's (1892) proposed solution to the belief report puzzle involves shifting the referents of embedded words so that the subject matter is their "secondary referents," viz. senses. Russell's (1905) proposal involves positing disguised descriptions whose subject matter is different properties. Davidson's (1968) solution to the analogous indirect discourse puzzles involves allowing different utterances of 'that' to have different utterances as subject matter. Crimmins and Perry's unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports involves allowing utterances to tacitly refer to different notions and ideas, and thus have different mental particulars as subject matter. Do not all of these proposals commit the subject matter fallacy? Consideration of this final tension thus points us toward the resolution I am advocating: The central thesis advanced in Perry (1989) and endorsed by semantic relativism, viz. that the truth-conditional contents of some thoughts and utterances contain unarticulated constituents, is correct. The unarticulated constituent analysis of belief reports, however, commits the subject-matter fallacy and should be rejected.<sup>29</sup>

## Notes

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1. My use of ‘pertains to’ is intended to connote a general and theoretically neutral sense of representation: roughly, a thought or declarative utterance *pertains to* an entity *x* if and only if its truth depends upon how things are with *x*. Thus a thought or utterance can pertain to an entity *x* either by *being about* *x*, or by merely *concerning* *x*. I will have more to say with regard to Perry’s distinction between *being about* and *concerning* below.
  2. Though, as Recanati (2007: 226) points out, it does not follow from (a) entity *O* is an unarticulated constituent of the content of the thought *T* which is expressed by utterance *U*, that (b) there is no other thought *T’* such that *O* is an *articulated* constituent of the content of *T’*.
  3. That the *thought use* and the *language use* are closely related but nonetheless distinct has led to some confusion in debates over whether or not there are any unarticulated constituents. For example, Stanley (2000), who is concerned with defending the compositionality of language, assumes that if *O* is an unarticulated constituent of the content of an utterance, then *O* is represented neither overtly by some phonetically realized element in the utterance nor by any aphonic element at the level of mental representation known as *logical form*. In short, Stanley ignores the distinction between being an unarticulated constituent of the content of an utterance and being an unarticulated constituent of the content of a thought thereby expressed. Recanati (2002) criticizes Stanley’s (2001) “argument from binding” against unarticulated constituents, and in so doing Recanati more-or-less adopts Stanley’s use of the term and thus also ignores the distinction. Neale (2007) takes Stanley (2000) to task for ignoring the distinction, though the issue of whether or not Stanley’s “binding argument” succeeds in justifying the positing of aphonic elements in logical forms seems to be independent of the confusion surrounding the use of ‘unarticulated constituents’.
  4. This conception of cognitive states is implied by what Perry says regarding *belief states*:

The term ‘belief state’ suggests to many the total doxastic state of the agent, but I do not use it in that way. Two agents, each of whom has just looked outdoors and seen rain, could be in the same belief state, in my sense, in virtue of the aspect of their total states that would lead each of them to say, ‘It is raining’, even though there is little else they would be disposed to say. (1989,149, note 4)

5. Recanati (2007, part 9) argues against Perry that there are no unarticulated constituents of the aboutness-content of utterances; Recanati thus maintains that there are no unarticulated constituents in the aboutness-content of either thoughts or utterances, and thus only concerning-content contains unarticulated



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- constituents. Recanati, however, misinterprets Perry's motivation for supposing there are unarticulated constituents of the aboutness-content of utterances. Recanati interprets Perry's positing of this variety of unarticulated constituent as resulting from Perry's mistaken endorsement of the "externality principle." This principle in effect requires that any unarticulated constituent of the concerning-content of an utterance "must be contributed by the external environment rather than cognitively discriminated" (2007: 224). Recanati thinks that Perry is forced by this restriction to posit unarticulated constituents in the aboutness-content of utterances that should, according to Recanati, be in the concerning-content. But it is not the externality principle that motivates Perry to posit unarticulated constituents in the aboutness-content of some utterances. As explained above, Perry is compelled to posit unarticulated constituents of the aboutness-content of some utterances because he maintains (i) That if utterance U expresses thought T, then the aboutness-content of U just is the aboutness-content of T. (ii) There are utterances U and thoughts T such that U expresses T yet the aboutness-content of T contains constituents unarticulated by U. As Recanati claims that (i) is equivalent to the "congruence principle," which he endorses (2007: 226), I suggest that what Recanati ought to reject (ii).
6. The distinction between concerning-content and aboutness-content is analogous to Recanati's (2007) distinction between the "Austinian proposition" and the "lekton."
  7. Following Perry (2007), I will treat the belief report use and the thought use as being distinct, but there is a sense in which the belief report use is an application of the language use in the case of belief reports. I think nothing important depends upon such architectonic issues.
  8. Here I am slightly amending Crimmins and Perry's example from their (1989). The example is inspired by Twain's *The Prince and the Pauper*.
  9. Which sort of content is relevant here? Are the notions of the young prince that are unarticulated by utterances of (1) and (2) constituents of the aboutness-content, or the concerning-content? Crimmins and Perry (1989) do not address this question, though I will address it in the following section.
  10. The above general description and the formal analysis that follows are presentations of what Crimmins and Perry call the *notion provision* analysis. But the official position adopted in Crimmins and Perry (1989: 706) maintains that some instances of the puzzle require a variation on the general strategy described above. (Crimmins 1993 defends the stronger claim that our belief-ascribing practices involve only notion provision.) The variation, which they call the *notion constraint* analysis, differs from the notion provision analysis in that the notions are (tacitly) existentially-quantified-over instead of being (tacitly) referred to. Crimmins and Perry present the notional constraint analysis with this formal schema:

$$Con(u) = \exists b [B(a,b,t) \wedge Content(b,t)=p \wedge \exists n_1, \dots, n_k \bigwedge_{r_i \text{ in } p} (C_i(n_i) \wedge Responsible(n_i, r_i, b))] \text{ (1989, 705)}$$

Here (each) ' $n_i$ ' is a variable bound by an existential quantifier, and (each) ' $C_i$ ' designates a condition or *constraint* that some notion or other must satisfy. Crimmins and Perry suggest that this notion constraint analysis applies to belief reports, and negated belief reports, which are intuitively true or false even though it is obvious that the subject of the report does not have an appropriate notion (or idea), though in Clapp (1995) I argue that the notion constraint analysis does not solve the problem. At any rate, the tension I am concerned to articulate here arises (in slightly different ways) for both analyses, and thus I will focus my remarks on the notion provision analysis.

11. The notion constraint analysis also fails when applied to my utterance of (3), though for slightly different reasons. The notion constraint analysis would yield the following:  $Con(u^*) =$

$$\exists b [B(\text{Perry's son}, b, t^*) \wedge Content(b, t^*)=p^* \wedge \exists n \exists i (C(n) \wedge Responsible(n, R_{\text{Palo Alto}}, b) \wedge C'(i) \wedge Responsible(i, R_{\text{rain}}, b))]$$

where ' $n$ ' and ' $i$ ' range over notions and ideas, respectively, ' $C()$ ' designates a constraint on notions, and ' $C'()$ ' designates a constraint on ideas. Since Perry's son utilizes no notion of Palo Alto in his belief, then regardless of what  $C()$  is he utilizes no notion that satisfies it. So the notion constraint analysis incorrectly predicts that my utterance of (3) is false. (Though again it would perhaps be more appropriate to say that the notion constraint analysis simply does not apply to such reports of beliefs with unarticulated constituents.)

12. Moreover, since the analyses themselves are supposed to explain the truth conditions of utterances of attitude ascriptions, the predicate ' $Con()$ ' in the formal schema presenting the notion provision and notion constraint analyses must be interpreted as *concerning-content*, for only concerning-content is guaranteed to be full truth-conditional. And this suggests that when Crimmins and Perry apply  $Content()$  to a subutterance of a complement clause of a belief report it is again concerning-content that is the relevant sort of content. (Though this does raise the question as to why sometimes Crimmins and Perry use ' $Con()$ ' and other times use ' $Content()$ ' – the variation in notation is nowhere explained.)
13. The relation of *responsibility* and related concepts such as that of *roles* and *filling* would also have to be amended so that notions could be said to be *responsible* for *roles* in *propositional-functions* instead of full truth-conditional

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- propositions*, but I see no obstacle in the way of doing this. So, since nothing of importance depends upon such details, I will ignore such complexities.
14. Perry endorses adoption of what he calls the “external viewpoint” (2007: 540-541) when characterizing beliefs of others that have unarticulated constituents. Perry considers a case in which a young child who is unaware of time-zones looks at her watch and thereby comes to believe that it is quarter to one. The belief she acquires thus *concerns* the time-zone she is in when she acquires the belief, and this time-zone is thus an unarticulated constituent of the concerning-content of her belief. Perry then states that he can “identify the information she gets from her watch within my richer system, with the proposition ‘It is quarter to one Pacific Time’.” This certainly suggests that Perry thinks it would be correct to report the child’s belief from the “external viewpoint” by uttering ‘She believes that it is quarter to one Pacific Time’. Moreover, Perry (1986: 150-151) maintains that there is very tight connection between thoughts which merely *concern* entities and indexicals, so it is even more plausible that the child’s belief could be accurately reported, from the external viewpoint, with an appropriately located utterance of ‘She believes that it is quarter to one *here*’.
  15. It has been suggested to me that Crimmins and Perry might somehow resolve this problem by invoking Crimmins (1991: 58-73) theory of *tacit belief*. The proposal would then be to treat reports of beliefs whose concerning-contents contain unarticulated constituents in the same way that Crimmins (1991) proposes treating reports of tacit beliefs. The suggestion, however, is a non-starter. For under Crimmins’ theory beliefs with unarticulated constituents in their concerning-content are clearly *not* tacit beliefs. According to Crimmins’ theory, subject *a* tacitly believes that *p* only if *a* possesses notions and ideas of all of the constituents of *p*; what makes the belief tacit is if *a* does not actually combine all these notions and ideas into an *explicit* belief, as Crimmins puts it, for him a tacit belief is a “hypothetical explicit belief” (1991: 61). But clearly beliefs whose concerning-contents contain unarticulated constituents are not “hypothetically explicit” in this sense.
  16. Bach shows that “every case is a Paderewski case, at least potentially” (1997: 233), by which he means that for any that-clause ‘that *S*’ one can construct a story involving an agent *A* so that utterances of both ‘*A* believes that *S*’ and ‘*A* does not believe that *S*’ are intuitively true. Bach maintains that this illustrates that that-clauses only *describe*, and do not *specify*, beliefs. If this is correct, then we should also expect it to be the case that for any belief *b*, *b* could be accurately described, for some purpose, by a that-clause ‘that *S*’ and not accurately described, for some purpose, by ‘that *S*\*’, even when ‘*S*’ and ‘*S*\*’ articulate the same proposition.
  17. I here assume familiarity with Putnam’s (1975) Twin-Earth thought experiments.

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18. Recall that if an utterance U expresses a thought T, and entity O is articulated by T, then U is about and does not merely concern O. Thus if an utterance U has O as an unarticulated constituent of its concerning- content, then O is not articulated by the thought T expressed by U. So, for example, if Perry's son's utterance of 'It's raining' merely concerns and is not about Palo Alto, then the thought he thereby expresses contains no mental representation of Palo Alto, and thus the thought also merely concerns Palo Alto.
  19. Though Crimmins and Perry (1989) do not explicitly address the issue of the difference in cognitive significance between, e.g., utterances of (1) and (2), it is relatively clear that they think their theory is at least relevant to the explanation of this difference. They claim, for example, that their theory is superior to those of Salmon (1986) and Soames (1989) on the grounds that these other theories "explain the apparent [falsity] of statements like (1) as an illusion generated by pragmatic features of such claims," while on their unarticulated constituent analysis such pragmatic features "do not create an illusion, but help to identify the reality the report is about." They summarize the advantages of their theory by stating their theory "honors the intuition" that utterances of (1) and (2) differ in truth value. These remarks strongly suggest that Crimmins and Perry take their theory to explain not only why, e.g., utterances of (1) and (2) can in fact differ in truth value, but moreover to explain why we *intuit*, or *judge*, that such utterances differ in truth value. That is, they take their unarticulated constituent analysis to be at least relevant to explain the *cognitive significance* of such utterances.
  20. Hence Crimmins and Perry seem to be committed to a hierarchy of notions, and notions of notions, etc, that is analogous to Frege's hierarchy of senses, and senses of senses, etc. If the belief I express when I utter 'Miles Hendon believes that Edward Tudor is of royal blood' must contain a notion of one of Miles Hendon's notions of the young prince, then the belief that you express when you report my metabelief with an utterance of 'He believes that Miles Hendon believes that Edward Tudor is of royal blood' must (i) tacitly refer to one of my notions of one of Miles Hendon's notions of the young prince, and (ii) express a belief of yours that contains a notion of my notion of one of Miles Hendon's notions of the young prince. This, it seems to me, is too much to believe.
  21. Similar problems arise for the notion constraint analysis: just as in the cases of the notion provision analysis there are no "external guarantees" that can fix which notions (and ideas) are tacitly referred to by an utterance of a belief report, so in the case of the notion constraint analysis there are no "external guarantees" that can fix which constraints are tacitly designated by an utterance of a belief report.

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22. Or in the case of the notion constraint analysis, there are no “external guarantees” that could determine which *constraints* are the unarticulated constituents.
  23. I think it is telling that in the passage above Crimmins and Perry do not explicitly invoke the concept of unarticulated constituents being fixed by an “external guarantee.” This concept would apply to weather reports, time reports, and velocity reports, but Crimmins and Perry cannot invoke the concept here because they are attempting to motivate the claim that the contents of belief reports also contain unarticulated constituents, but, as was previously explained, there are no such “external guarantees” in the case of belief reports.
  24. Paradigmatic endorsements of relativism include Kölbel (2002), MacFarlane (2003), and Richard (2004). For an introduction to semantic relativism, see Kölbel (2008).
  25. I believe that Kölbel (2002) was the first to motivate semantic relativism by appeal to instances of faultless disagreement, though the approach is developed in more detail in Lasersohn (2005).
  26. Lasersohn (2005) does not explicitly describe a layer of content analogous to what I called *concerning-content*. This is because Lasersohn presents his relativistic semantics within a formal theory that is closely associated with Kaplan’s (1989) theory of demonstratives: whereas Kaplan’s *circumstances of evaluation* are pairs of worlds and times, Lasersohn’s are triples of worlds, times and judges. But it is not difficult to translate back and forth between Lasersohn’s Kaplan-inspired system and Perry’s distinction between *concerning* and *being about*: whereas Lasersohn has only one sort of content, a function from world, time, judge triples to truth values, one could instead have two kinds of functions: the first, which would be equivalent to aboutness-content, would be functions from judges, to the functions of the second kind. And functions of the second kind, which would be equivalent to concerning-contents, would be functions from world, time pairs to truth values. (And of course the latter are equivalent to what Kaplan calls content.)
  27. Lasersohn takes pains to explain how, given Peter’s exocentric judgment concerning Max that riding the roller-coaster was fun, an utterance of (8) will be true. But Lasersohn does not address the issue of why an utterance of (8) would be true while an utterance of (9), which seems to attribute the same content to the same subject, would be false.
  28. See Kölbel (2008) for a summary of additional parameters (i.e. entities relative to which the truth of contents would be true or false) proposed by semantic relativists.
  29. A version of this paper was presented at *The Fourth UT-Austin/UNAM Philosophy Conference: Communicative Practices*, held at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas on October 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2009. I am thankful to the participants – particularly Maite Ezcurdia and Enrico Grube – for very helpful

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